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CNIL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF BRONX: HOUSING PART G

769 EASTLLC,
Index No.
L&T 33577/19

Petitioner,
Present:
Hon. Christel F. Garland
-against-

VICTOR OFORI, JOHN DOE, and JANE DOE,

DECISION/ORDER

Respond~nts.

RECITATION, AS REQUIRED BY CPLR 2219(A), OF THE PAPERS CONSIDERED IN
TIIE REVIEW OF THIS MOTION BY RESPONDENT TO DISMISS

PAPERS
Notice of Motion, Affidavits & Affirmation Annexed
Answering Affidavits
Replying Affidavits & Affirmation Annexed

NUMBERED
1
2
3

UPON THE FOREGOING CITED PAPERS, THE DEC1SION/ORDER IN THIS MOTION IS
AS FOLLOWS:
Petitioner commenced this summary holdover proceeding seeking to recover possession of.the
second floor unit of the building located at 769 East 2 l 81h Street, Bronx, New York, following
service of a 10-day notice to quit titled ''ten ( 10) day notice to quit with exhibition of deed",
alleging that Petitioner took title to the premises pursuant to a judgment of foreclosure and
subsequent auction and sale of the property.
Victor Ofori ("Respondent") appeared by counsel and his answer was deemed a general denial.
After no resolution could be reached, the proceeding was transferred to the Expediter and
referred to this part for trial.

Oh the date scheduled for trial, Respondent sought leave to interpose an amended answer which
was deemed s.erved and file4 without objection and includes a counterclaim for harassment 1•
Petitioner's answer to Respondent's counterclaim was deemed a general denial.

---

---------- ~--~~------

1 With

.......~~~~

the understanding that Respondent was precluded from raising any traverse claims.

At trial, Petitioner's witness, Kamlesh Patel, testified to the elements of Petitioner's ptima facje
case which consisted of introducing. a certified copy of the deed for the property into evidence.
At the close of Petitioner's case, Respondent moved for an order dismissing the petition. The
oral motion was adjourned pursuant to a briefing schedule and later argued before this Court.
Respondent's motion is made pursuant to§ 4401 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR"),
§ 713 (5) of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law ("RP APL") and§ 5-703 (1) of the
General Obligations Law ("GBL").
In support of his motion, Respondent argues that the petition must be dismissed as a matter of
law b~cause Petitioner failed to establish its prima facie case as it relates.to the ownership of the
building, Petitioner lacks standing to bring this proceeding and Petitioner failed to properly
exhibit the referee's deed within the meaning of the law.
In the alternative, Respondent seeks an·order pursuant to CPLR § 321 (b) (2) disqualifying the
law firm representing Petitioner based on his claim that an attorney employed at the firm ought
to be called as a witness at trial.
In support of bis claims, Respondent argues that Petitioner failed to offer into evidence a piece of
writing that reflects that Wilmington Savings Fund Society; FSB, dba as Christiana Trust,
authorized Sarah Nelson, a request for offer rnanager"for Fay Servicing LLC, to execute the deed
transferring the property to Petitioner. As a result, Respondent argues that Petitioner failed to
satisfy the Statute of Frauds rendering the deed void and unenforceable as a result of which the
deed is insufficient proof that Petitioner owns the subject property.

In addition, Respondent argues that even if this Court were to bold that Petitioner in fact owns
the subject property, Petitioner nonetheless does not have standing to piaintain this proceeding
because of Petitioner's admission that Petitioner is not the holder of the deed delivered pursuant
to the foreclosure sale.
Further, Respondent argues that should this Court find that Petitioner has standing, Petitioner
nonetheless failed to prove that prior to commencing this proceeding it exhibited the referee's
deed or a properly certified copy of the referee's deed to Respondent as required by RP APL§
713 (5).

In the alternative, Respondent argues that should this Court not dismiss the petition, it should
disqualify the law firm representing Petitionez: in this proceeding because a partner at the firm
should be called as s witness in this proceeding.
In opposition, Petitioner contends that its proof at trial, including the testimony of its witness, the
admission into evidence of a certified deed for the property, and the Court having taken judicial
notice of the contents of the court file, is sufficient to sustain its burden of proof. In support of
its position, Petitioner contends that the Housing Court lacks the jurisdiction to adjudicate an
-~......_._

______

affirmative claim for title, and asserts that it served upon Respondent certified copies of two
deeds establishing Petitioner's ownership interest in the premises.
Petitioner also challenges Respondent's argument, which it frames as a challenge to its
ownership of the property based on its alleged failure to show that the prior owner of the
property bad the authority to convey the premises to Petitioner, as creating an impossible burden
for Petitioner to sustain within the context of a summary proceeding brought before a Court of
limited jurisdiction.
In response to Respondent's standing argument, Petitioner contends that exhibition of a certified
copy of the deed by means other than personal delivery has been found to suffice. As such,
Petitioner argues that its service of the deed along with the pleadings and the fact that
Respondent does not challenge service.do not subject the petition to dismissal and establish that
Petitioner has standing in.this proceeding.

Petitioner further contends that Respondent's claim of disqualification is untimely and asserts
that no notice to produce a witness bas been served on Petitioner. Notwithstanding, Petitioner
argues that Respondent has not met his burden for di~qualification as bis allegations are based on
speculation that Dustin Bowman, esquire, may have personal .knowledge of the events
surrounding Petitioner's acquisition of the premises which does not make him a necessary
witness and does not override Petition~r's right to choose its own counsel. And, Petitioner
asserts that the law firm itself should not be disqualified as there are other members of.the firm
and if required Mr. Bowman can testify about his personal knowledge of the events surrounding
the closing.

In Response, Respondent argues that Petitioner misunderstood and/or mischaracterized his
argument as it relates to Petitioner's ownership of the property. Respondent argues that hjs
argument is based on the requirement that Petitioner show an actual possessory interest in the
premises and does not seek to have·Petitioner establish the prior owner's authority to transfer
title which is not required. Responden~ asserts that he does not argue that Petitioner does not in
fact own the subject property, but on_ly that it failed to show that it has enforceable title to the
property by failing to show that Ms. Nelson had aut110rity to sign deeds on behalf of Wilmington
Savings not that Wilmington it~elf did not have authority to transfer title. A,s a result,
Respondent argues, Petitioner is unable to show that it has an actual possessory interest in the
prerr..ises.
Respondent also reiterates bis argument that since Petitioner is not the holder of the referee's
deed delivered pursuant to a foreclosure sale it lacks standing. And, Petitioner's failure to file a
properly certi~ed copy of the referee's deed with the Court, its failure to offer a properly
certified deed into evidence and its failure to elicit testimony that a properly certified copy of the
deed was served on Respondent requires dismissal of the proceeding.

- -

Lastly, Respondent continues to maintain that disqualification is required as Mr. Bowman's
knowledge is based on bis statements in a letter to Respondent dated June 14, 2019 which
confmned his presence at the time the deed was exequted. In addition, Respondent argues th.at
---·-1.he.ktte.r.shaw.S.1hatM.t .. ,B.awman..has Jirs.tdlarui.kno.wle.dge..o.t:tbe facts..:r.egarding. the~ v.alidity o.L.

the deed, it failed to show that anyone else has knowledge of these facts, and Mr. Bowman's
testimony regarding the certification ofthe deeds which were certified by him is necessary
because be alone can testify about his certification of these documents.
Pursuant to CPLR § 440 J, any party may move for judgment with respect to a cause of action or
issue upon the ground that the moving party is ~ntitled to judgment as a matter of law, after the
close of the evidence presented by an opposing party with respect to such cause of action or
issue, or at any time on the basis of admissions. It bas been held that "a motion for a direc~ed
verdict pursuant to CPLR § 4401 should not be granted unless there is no rational process by
which the fact-finder could base a finding in.favor of the nonmovingparty" and that "in
assessing th.e motion, the.court ml.;lst afford the party opposing the motion every inference that
may be properly drawn from the evidence presented, and the evidence must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party" (145 East J6'h Street, LLC v Spencer, 49 Misc 3d
128 (A) [App Term, pt Dept 2015] (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
At the outset, the Court' notes that the deed which purports to transfer title to Petitioner does not
include the required writing giving the signatory, Ms. Nelson, the authority to act on behalf of
Wilmington Savings Fund Society (see§ 5-703 of the GBL) ("~estate or interest in real
property ... cannot be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or d~lared unless by act or
operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing, subscribed by the person creating,
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent, thereunto
authorized by writing"). Here, the deed is acknowledged by Ms. Nelson without any writing
granting her any authority to act on behalf of Wilmington Savings Fund Society which is not a
proper transfer and therefore calls into question whether Petiti_oner has good title and thus
standing to sue in th.is proceeding.
Secondly, Petitioner commenced this proceeding based on its claim that it became the title owner
of the subject apartment pursuant to a judgment of foreclosure and a subsequent au.ction and sale.
However, Petitioner's own pleadings reflect that it is not 769 East LLC that obtained title at
foreclosure. Rather the referee appointed by the Court in the foreclosure action transferred the
property to Wilmington Savings Fund Society following the entry of the judgement of
foreclosure and sale. It is Wilmi.ngton Savings Fund, the deed holdover pursuant to the judgment
of foreclosure and sale, that then transferred the property to Petitioner. As a result of these
transfers, Petitioner holds titl'e to the property by bargain and sale deed and not by reason of the
foreclosure judgment and sale. As held by .the Court in Fay Capital Corp. v Rans. NYLJ
12026650119347, *1 [Civ Ct, Kings County 2014)), "there is no statutory construction that
permits a subsequent owner such as the petitioner who is the third owner post foreclosure·... to
commence a holdover proceeding purSua.nt to RPAPL 713 [5)'1. ·
As to Respondent's argument that Petitioner failed to properly exhibit the deed to Respondent,

although exhibition of a deed following foreclosure by means other than personal service is now
permi"ssible, a certified copy of the deed is still required. Under the holding of Plotch v Dellis,
60 Misc 3d I [App Term, Second Department, 2d, 11th and 13th Jud Dists 2018] service of a copy
of the attorney's certification was fol:llld t0 suffice where the petition filed with the court bore the
certifying official's original certification. However, here not only were copies of the deed served
___ • __ on.Respondent, hut.a copy_of the..dee.cl i qclnding .a c.op)! of the.for.eclosurej.udgm.ent_and.sale. _

rather than an original were filed along with the petition. Although this would under the
appropriate circumstances subject the petition to dismissal, this requirement applies to
proceedings where the property has been sold in foreclosure (see RPAL§ 713 [5]).
Here, Petitioner is one owner removed from the owner who held title following the judgment of
foreclosure and sale and can.Ilot be held to this requirement. Notwithstanding, based on the
above, Petitioner is not the holder of title following the judgment of foreclosure and sale as it
claims herein. This, coupled with the fact that there js a question about the authority of one of
the signatories to the deed transferring title to Petitioner, requires that the petition be dismissed.
Petitioner's argument as it relates to a certified copy of the deed having been introdu.ced into
evidence at trial is insufficient to withstand clisnUssal for the reasons outlined above, and the
Court.notes that Respondent never waived his right to object to the propriety of this proceeding.
Respondent' s motion seeking disqualification of the law firm representir~g Petitioner in this
proceeding is denied as moot.
Based on the foregoing, Respondent's motion is GRANTED to the extent that the petition is
dismissed without prejudice to a proceeding predicated on a petition which accurately states the
interest of the petitioner in the premises from which removal is sought as required by RP APL §
741 [1].
The proceeding is adjourned to February 24, 2020 at 9:30 a.m. for a hearing on Respondent's
counterclaim relating harassment.
.

to

This constitutes the decision and order of this Court.
A copy of this order will be mailed to all.

DATED: January 28, 2020

SO ORDERED:

~?.

HON.~ARLAND
Christ.el F. Garland, J.H.C.

